The inherent epistemological limitation of econometric testing

30 Jun, 2023 at 09:24 | Posted in Statistics & Econometrics | 5 Comments

Behind the Model eBook by Peter Spiegler - EPUB Book | Rakuten Kobo United  StatesTo understand the relationship between economic data and economic phenomena, it is helpful first to be clear about what we mean by each of these terms. Following Jim Woodward (1989), we can characterize “phenomena” as features of our experience that we take to be “relatively stable” and “which are potential objects of explanation and prediction by general theory.” The phenomena themselves are in general not directly observable, and so in order to investigate claims about them, we require some observable representation. Data play this role. And although it is a crucial role, it is a supporting rather than a starring role. As Woodward suggests, “data are typically not viewed as potential objects of explanation by or derivation from general theory; indeed, they typically are of no theoretical interest except insofar as they constitute evidence” for claims about the phenomena. Data are simply matrices of numbers. Economically speaking, characterizing the internal relations of a matrix of numbers is not of inherent interest. It only becomes so when we claim that the numbers represent in some way actual phenomena of interest.

What is the nature of this representation? Data are, in a sense, meant to be a quantitative crystallization of the phenomena. In order to determine what will count as data for a particular phenomenon or set of phenomena, one must specify particular observable and quantifiable features of the world that can capture the meaning of the phenomena adequately for the purposes of one’s particular inquiry …

Inferences about the data are inferences about model objects and are therefore a part of the model narrative. We can validly interpret such inferences about the data as possible inferences about the underlying social phenomena only to the extent that we have established the plausibility of a homomorphic relationship between the data and the aspects of the underlying phenomena they are meant to represent. This homomorphism requirement, then, is an extension of the essential compatibility requirement: in empirical modeling exercises, the requirement of essential compatibility between model and target includes a requirement of homomorphism between data and target (because the data are a part of the model) …

Econometricians are, of course, well aware of the importance of the relationship between the data and the underlying phenomena of interest. In the literature, this relationship is generally couched in terms of a data-generating process (DGP) … If we were to be able to perceive the true DGP in its entirety, we would essentially know the complete underlying structure whose observable precipitates are the data. Our only evidence of the DGP, however, is the data …

It is important to note, however, that characterizing pieces of the data-generating process is an intra-model activity. It reveals the possible mathematical structure underlying a matrix of numbers, and it is properly judged according to (and only according to) the relevant rules of mathematics. In contrast, the requirement that a relation of homomorphism exist between the data and the underlying phenomena is concerned with the relationship between model and target entities. The extent to which data satisfy this requirement in any given case cannot be determined through econometric analysis, nor does econometric analysis obviate the need to establish that the requirement is met. On the contrary, the results of an econometric analysis of a given data set — i.e. the characterization of a piece of its DGP — can be validly interpreted as providing epistemic access to the target only if it is plausible that a relation of homomorphism holds between the data and the aspects of the target they ostensibly represent.

Econometrics is supposed to be able to test economic theories. But to serve as a testing device you have to make many assumptions, many of which cannot be tested or verified. To make things worse, there are also rarely strong and reliable ways of telling us which set of assumptions is preferred. Trying to test and infer causality from data you have to rely on assumptions such as disturbance terms being ‘independent and identically distributed’; functions being additive, linear, and with constant coefficients; parameters being’ ‘invariant under intervention; variables being ‘exogenous’, ‘identifiable’, ‘structural and so on. Unfortunately, we are seldom or never informed of where that kind of ‘knowledge’ comes from, beyond referring to the economic theory that one is supposed to test.

That leaves us in the awkward position of admitting that if the assumptions made do not hold, the inferences, conclusions and testing outcomes econometricians come up with simply do not follow the data and statistics they use.

The central question is ‘How do we learn from empirical data?’ But we have to remember that the value of testing hinges on our ability to validate the — often unarticulated — assumptions on which the testing models build. If the model is wrong, the test apparatus simply gives us fictional values. There is always a risk that one puts a blind eye to some of those non-fulfilled technical assumptions that actually make the testing results — and the inferences we build on them — unwarranted. Econometric testing builds on the assumption that the hypotheses can be treated as hypotheses about (joint) probability distributions and that economic variables can be treated as if pulled out of an urn as a random sample. Most economic phenomena are nothing of the kind.

Most users of the econometric toolbox seem to have a built-in blindness to the fact that mathematical-statistical modelling in social sciences is inherently incomplete since it builds on the presupposition that the model properties are — without serious argumentation or warrant — assumed to also apply to the intended real-world target systems studied. Many of the processes and structures that we know play essential roles in the target systems do not show up — often for mathematical-statistical tractability reasons — in the models. The bridge between model and reality is failing. Valid and relevant information is unrecognized and lost, making the models harmfully misleading and largely irrelevant if our goal is to learn, explain or understand anything about actual economies and societies. Without giving strong evidence for an essential compatibility between model and reality the analysis becomes nothing but a fictitious storytelling of questionable scientific value.

It is difficult to find any hard evidence that econometric testing has been able to exclude any economic theory. If we are to judge econometrics based on its capacity of eliminating invalid theories, it has not been a very successful business.

5 Comments

  1. https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/math-2022-0598/html is relevant: Mainstream economics seems cavalier in its use of probability and statistics. Maybe some of this stuff matters. (Even if we quibble with Lars’ account.)

    • Dave,
      Insofar as I can comprehend the theoretical mathematical article which you reference, it appears to be largely irrelevant to economics because it ignores Central Limit Theorems.
      Prof. Syll’s post suffers from the same fundamental defect.
      This is not a mere “quibble”, as explained by Gkedenko & Kolmogorov in 1949:
      .
      — “The epistemological value of the theory of probability is revealed only by limit theorems. Moreover, without limit theorems it is impossible to understand the real content of the primary concept of all our sciences — the concept of probability.
      In fact, all epistemologic value of the theory of probability is based on this: that large-scale random phenomena in their collective action create strict, nonrandom regularity.
      The very concept of mathematical probability would be fruitless if it did not find its realization in the frequency of occurrence of events under large-scale repetition of uniform conditions (a realization which is always approximate and not wholly reliable, but which becomes, in principle, arbitrarily precise and reliable as the number of repetitions increases).”
      – Gkedenko & Kolmogorov 1949 – Limit Distributions for Sums of Independent Random Variables

  2. Are we certain that Spiegler is entirely sane? The snippet of that essay betrays an odd way of writing about objects of study in a social science. I expected some comment from Prof Syll on the ontology, not econometric assumptions.

    • As the fundamental problem is ontological, Spiegler has just given us a lot of red herrings.

      More generally, either neo-classical economists are deluded or it is in their own vested interest to ignore the elephant in the room.

  3. There is a fundamental error in Prof. Syll’s comments in the last two paragraphs of this post.
    He claims that “Econometric testing builds on the assumption that…economic variables can be treated as if pulled out of an urn as a random sample. Most economic phenomena are nothing of the kind.”
    .
    This crass blunder is repeated from numerous previous posts. For example, in a recent post he wrote:
    “Probabilities cannot be spoken of – and actually do not at all exist – without the existence of nomological probability machines”, eg the random “ drawing cards from a deck, picking balls from an urn, spinning a roulette wheel or tossing coins”.
    .
    However, the ways in which probabilities can be estimated are SIMILAR IN KIND for both games of chance and economic phenomena. There are two types of method – theoretical methods and empirical methods.
    .
    Theoretical methods
    ————————
    With many games of chance, the probabilities of outcomes can be derived theoretically using probability distributions derived from rules for the game. For example, the probability of a particular outcome from throwing of an n-sided dice can be derived as 1/n.
    This assumes that the rules of the game of chance are applied in a consistent unbiased way.
    In reality the results from games may not exactly correspond to theoretical probabilities due to sensitivities to manufacturing imperfections, initial conditions, throwing methods and the practices of game operators.
    .
    Similarly, with economic phenomena – probabilities can be estimated theoretically using a general rule of the “game” we call “nature”, namely the Central Limit Theorem (CLT).
    The CLT in effect states that in many situations the probability distribution of a variable deviating from its estimated average value of will tend towards an approximately normal distribution.

    Like theoretical distributions for games of chance, the CLT is derived from assumptions which may not always apply exactly. In particular it is assumed that deviations from estimated average values stem from several sources which have independent and identically distributed effects.
    However, even if the number of observations is not very large or deviations not strictly independent, their combined effect may still be approximately normally distributed.
    .
    Empirical methods
    ———————–
    As noted above the results of games of chance may not exactly correspond exactly to to theoretical probabilities due to simplifying assumptions.
    An alternative method is to base estimated probabilities of outcome recurring on samples of historical data. The probability of an event = approximately the number of times the event happened in trials / the number of trials.
    .
    Similarly, as noted above, the CLT is derived from assumptions which which may not apply exactly in some situations. However:
    Many empirical findings show an approximately normal distribution as expected from the CLT, eg weights of new-born babies, heights and IQs (given their age, sex, race), crop yields of similar plots of land, etc.
    This provides general (though not infallible) support for the widespread implicit or explicit use of the normal assumption by ordinary folk and scientists in order to be able to meaningfully concisely communicate regarding uncertainties using the language of probability.

    Moreover, the suitability of the normal assumption can be checked. A simple histogram of the residuals/errors from a regression will give a good idea as to whether the normal approximation is appropriate.
    .
    Furthermore there are also several statistical tests for suitability of the normal assumption based on the residuals, eg the Jarque–Bera and Anderson–Darling Tests.


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