LARS P. SYLL

Svensk inflationsberäkning — rena skämtet!

Den andra saken som framgår tydligt vid en titt på statistiken är vad som saknas i KPI: prisuppgången på bostäder.

Posten boende står visserligen för hela 25 procent av indexet. Kostnaden har sedan mellan 1996 och 2021 stigit med drygt 40 procent.

Vänta nu här, säger alla som tillbringat mer än fem minuter pà sajten Hemnet de senaste 15 åren. Är det inte en alleles for låg siffra?

Visst är det så. Det genomsnittliga kvadratmeterpriset på bostadsrätter i Sverige har enligt Svensk Mäklarstatistik stigit med 800 procent mellan 1996 och 2021. Villapriserna har ökat med 435 procent och i Stockholm med 550 procent, visar statistik från SCB.

Varför har inte detta drivit upp inflationen?

Den enkla förklaringen är att priset på den enskilt största affären i de flesta människors liv, bostaden, inte ingår i KPI. Det som räknas med är hyror, avgifter och räntekostnader för bostadsrätter samt drifts- och räntekostnader för villor …

Samtidigt som stigande bostadspriser ersatt vädret som det kanske vanligaste samtalsämnet svenskar emellan och lett till att hushållen dragit på sig några tusen miljarder i bolån, är det alltså en icke-fràga för SCB vid beräkning av inflationen och därmed för Riksbanken när den sätter sin ränta.

Brauchen wir eine Übergewinnsteuer?

Economics as ideology

Tax cuts for the wealthy were supposed to stimulate growth and make everyone better off. There was dispute about this within the profession, but there were also many economists who provided intellectual support for the claim that tax cuts will create growth and widespread prosperity. The evidence from the Bush and Reagan tax cuts does not support this claim, but it is still made by some economists and this gives those who are serving wealthy interests or who want to force government to shrink by starving it of revenue the cover they need for their arguments …

We do need more humility about what we do and do not know, more willingness to change our minds when the evidence disagrees with our favorite theoretical model, and the willingness to acknowledge disagreement within the profession. But most of all we need to take a strong stand against those inside and outside the profession who misuse economic theory and empirical results for political and ideological purposes.

Mark Thoma

You never hear anyone at our seminars telling the lecturer that the assumptions on which his models are built are only made for ideological reasons. But that does not necessarily mean — whether on the surface or not — that academic analysis is judged on its merits. What it means is that we have a catechism that no one dares to question. And that catechism has become hegemonic for particular reasons, one of which may very well be of an ideological nature. When the neoclassical theory was developed in the late 19th century one of the reasons was that some economists — e.g. Böhm-Bawerk — thought that the Ricardian (labour value) tradition had become too radical and could be used as a dangerous weapon in the class struggle. Marginalism was explicitly seen as a way to counter that.

Even though some economists seem to think that facts are bound to win in the end, yours truly begs to differ.

Take the rational expectations assumption. Rational expectations in the mainstream economists’ world imply that relevant distributions have to be time-independent. This amounts to assuming that an economy is like a closed system with known stochastic probability distributions for all different events. In reality, it is straining one’s beliefs to try to represent economies as outcomes of stochastic processes. An existing economy is a single realization tout court, and hardly conceivable as one realisation out of an ensemble of economy-worlds since an economy can hardly be conceived as being completely replicated over time. It is — to say the least — very difficult to see any similarity between these modelling assumptions and the expectations of real persons. In the world of the rational expectations hypothesis, we are never disappointed in any other way than as when we lose at the roulette wheels. But real life is not an urn or a roulette wheel. And that’s also the reason why allowing for cases where agents make ‘predictable errors’ in DSGE models doesn’t take us any closer to a relevant and realist depiction of actual economic decisions and behaviours.

‘Rigorous’ and ‘precise’ DSGE models cannot be considered anything else than unsubstantiated conjectures as long as they aren’t supported by evidence from outside the theory or model. To my knowledge no in any way decisive empirical evidence has been presented.

So, given this lack of empirical evidence, why do mainstream economists still stick to using these kinds of theories and models building on blatantly ridiculous assumptions? Well, one reason, I would argue, is of an ideological nature. Those models and the assumptions they build on standardly have a neoliberal or market-friendly bias. I guess that is also one of the — ideological — reasons those models and theories are so dear to many Chicago economists and ‘New Keynesian’ macroeconomists …