Revealed preference theory — much fuss about nothing

7 Jun, 2023 at 10:17 | Posted in Economics | 16 Comments

Paul-Samuelson-Pioneer-of-Revealed-Preference-TheoryThirty years ago yours truly wrote an article on revealed preference theory that got published in History of Political Economy (no. 25, 1993).

Paul Samuelson wrote a kind letter and informed me that he was the one who had recommended it for publication. But although he liked it a lot, he also wrote a comment — published in the same volume of HOPE — saying:

Between 1938 and 1947, and since then as Pålsson Syll points out, I have been scrupulously careful not to claim for revealed preference theory novelties and advantages it does not merit. But Pålsson Syll’s readers must not believe that it was all redundant fuss about not very much.

Notwithstanding Samuelson’s comment, I do still think it basically was much fuss about ‘not very much.’

In 1938 Paul Samuelson offered a replacement for the then-accepted theory of utility. The cardinal utility theory was discarded with the following words: “The discrediting of utility as a psychological concept robbed it of its possible virtue as an explanation of human behaviour in other than a circular sense, revealing its emptiness as even a construction” (1938, 61). According to Samuelson, the ordinalist revision of utility theory was, however, not drastic enough. The introduction of the concept of a marginal rate of substitution was considered “an artificial convention in the explanation of price behaviour” (1938, 62). One ought to analyze the consumer’s behaviour without having recourse to the concept of utility at all, since this did not correspond to directly observable phenomena. The old theory was criticized mainly from a methodological point of view, in that it used non-observable concepts and propositions.

The new theory should avoid this and thereby shed “the last vestiges of utility analysis” (1938, 62). Its main feature was a consistency postulate which said: “if an individual selects batch one over batch two, he does not at the same time select two over one” (1938, 65). From this “perfectly clear” postulate and the assumptions of given demand functions and that all income is spent, Samuelson (1938) and (1938a), could derive all the main results of ordinal utility theory (single-valuedness and homogeneity of degree zero of demand functions, and negative semi-definiteness of the substitution matrix).

In 1948 Samuelson no longer considered his “revealed preference” approach a new theory. It was then seen as a means of revealing consistent preferences and enhancing the acceptability of the ordinary ordinal utility theory by showing how one could construct an individual’s indifference map by purely observing his market behaviour. Samuelson concluded his article by saying that “[t]he whole theory of consumer’s behavior can thus be based upon operationally meaningful foundations in terms of revealed preference” (1948, 251). As has been shown lately, this is true only if we inter alia assume the consumer to be rational and to have unchanging preferences that are complete, asymmetrical, non-satiated, strictly convex, and transitive (or continuous). The theory, originally intended as a substitute for the utility theory, has, as Houthakker clearly notes, “tended to become complementary to the latter” (1950, 159).

Only a couple of years later, Samuelson held the view that he was in a position “to complete the programme begun a dozen years ago of arriving at the full empirical implications for demand behaviour of the most general ordinal utility analysis” (1950, 369). The introduction of Houthakker’s amendment assured integrability, and by that, the theory had according to Samuelson been “brought to a close” (1950, 355). Starting “from a few logical axioms of demand consistency … [one] could derive the whole of the valid utility analysis as corollaries” (1950, 370). Since Samuelson had shown the “complete logical equivalence” of revealed preference theory with the regular “ordinal preference approach,” it follows that “in principle there is nothing to choose between the formulations” (1953, 1). According to Houthakker (1961, 709), the aim of the revealed preference approach is “to formulate equivalent systems of axioms on preferences and on demand functions.”

awongBut if this is all, what has revealed preference theory then achieved? As it turns out, ordinal utility theory and revealed preference theory are – as Wong puts it – “not two different theories; at best, they are two different ways of expressing the same set of ideas” (2006, 118). And with regard to the theoretically solvable problem, we may still concur with Hicks that “there is in practice no direct test of the preference hypothesis” (1956, 58).

Sippel’s experiments showed “a considerable number of violations of the revealed preference axioms” (1997, 1442) and that from a descriptive point of view – as a theory of consumer behaviour – the revealed preference theory was of a very limited value.

Today it seems as though the proponents of revealed preference theory have given up the original 1938-attempt at building a theory on nothing else but observable facts, and settled instead on the 1950-version of establishing “logical equivalences.”

Mas-Collel et al. conclude their presentation of the theory by noting that “for the special case in which choice is defined for all subsets of X [the set of alternatives], a theory based on choice satisfying the weak axiom is completely equivalent to a theory of decision making based on rational preferences” (1995, 14).

When talking about determining people’s preferences through observation, Varian, for example, has “to assume that the preferences will remain unchanged” and adopts “the convention that … the underlying preferences … are known to be strictly convex.” He further postulates that the “consumer is an optimizing consumer.” If we are “willing to add more assumptions about consumer preferences, we get more precise estimates about the shape of indifference curves” (2006, 119-123, author’s italics). Given these assumptions, and that the observed choices satisfy the consistency postulate as amended by Houthakker, one can always construct preferences that “could have generated the observed choices.” This does not, however, prove that the constructed preferences really generated the observed choices, “we can only show that observed behaviour is not inconsistent with the statement. We can’t prove that the economic model is correct.”

Kreps holds a similar view, pointing to the fact that revealed preference theory is “consistent with the standard preference-based theory of consumer behavior” (1990, 30).

The theory of consumer behaviour has been developed in great part as an attempt to justify the idea of a downward-sloping demand curve. What forerunners like e.g. Cournot (1838) and Cassel (1899) did was merely assert this law of demand. The utility theorists tried to deduce it from axioms and postulates on individuals’ economic behaviour. Revealed preference theory tried to build a new theory and to put it in operational terms, but ended up just giving a theory logically equivalent to the old one. As such it also shares its shortcomings of being empirically unfalsifiable and of being based on unrestricted universal statements.

As Kornai (1971, 133) remarked, “the theory is empty, tautological. The theory reduces to the statement that in period t the decision-maker chooses what he prefers … The task is to explain why he chose precisely this alternative rather than another one.” Further, pondering Amartya Sen’s verdict of the revealed preference theory as essentially underestimating “the fact that man is a social animal and his choices are not rigidly bound to his own preferences only” (1982, 66) and Georgescu-Roegen’s (1966, 192-3) apt description, a harsh assessment of what the theory accomplished should come as no surprise:

georgescu1Lack of precise definition should not … disturb us in moral sciences, but improper concepts constructed by attributing to man faculties which he actually does not possess, should. And utility is such an improper concept … [P]erhaps, because of this impasse … some economists consider the approach offered by the theory of choice as a great progress … This is simply an illusion, because even though the postulates of the theory of choice do not use the terms ‘utility’ or ‘satisfaction’, their discussion and acceptance require that they should be translated into the other vocabulary … A good illustration of the above point is offered by the ingenious theory of the consumer constructed by Samuelson.

Nothing lost, nothing gained.

References
Cassel, Gustav 1899. ”Grundriss einer elementaren Preislehre.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 55.3:395-458.

Cournot, Augustin 1838. Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses. Paris. Translated by N. T. Bacon 1897 as Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas 1966. “Choice, Expectations, and Measurability.” In Analytical Economics: Issues and Problems. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Hicks, John 1956. A Revision of Demand Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Houthakker, Hendrik 1950. “Revealed Preference and the Utility Function.” Economica 17 (May):159-74.
–1961. “The Present State of Consumption Theory.” Econometrica 29 (October):704-40.

Kornai, Janos 1971. Anti-equilibrium. London: North-Holland.

Kreps, David 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Mas-Collel, Andreu et al. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.

Samuelson, Paul 1938. “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour.” Economica 5 (February):61-71.
–1938a. “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour: An Addendum.” Economica 5 (August):353-4.
–1947. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
–1948. “Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference.” Economica 15 (November):243-53.
–1950. “The Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory.” Economica 17 (November):355-85.
–1953. “Consumption Theorems in Terms of Overcompensation rather than Indifference Comparisons.” Economica 20 (February):1-9.

Sen, Amartya (1982). Choice, Welfare and Measurement. London: Basil Blackwell.

Sippel, Reinhard 1997. “An experiment on the pure theory of consumer’s behaviour.” Economic Journal 107:1431-44.

Varian, Hal 2006. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach. (7th ed.) New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Wong, Stanley 2006. The Foundations of Paul Samuelson’s Revealed Preference Theory. (Revised ed.) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

16 Comments

  1. A successful ex-trader talks about why economics training produces idiocy, why the worst of it ends up in academia and government. and why the consequences are very serious.

    • This video is ludicrous.
      Gary Stevenson extols the economic skills of stock and bond market traders, and he attributes his own wealth to his intellectual brilliance.
      .
      – He fails to discuss Keynes argument that market traders are not directly concerned with economics:
      “It is not a case of choosing [competitors in a beauty competition] that, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.” (Keynes 1936, General Theory, ch.12).
      .
      – He fails to note that traders are mostly concerned with short-term price movements rather than the medium and longer term issues which concern other economists.
      .
      – He fails to explain why on average managed investment funds perform worse than tracker/index funds. The latter simply which simply invest in a representative portfolio of many shares and bonds.
      .
      – He fails to note that funds and individuals that perform above average either illegally make use of insider information, or they are simply lucky.
      .
      – He fails to deal with the glaring inconsistency between this video and his previous admissions that his financial success was due to lucky bets.
      “When I was 20, I won a card game. The prize was a trading job for Citibank. I started that job in 2008, and by 2011 I was the bank’s most profitable trader in the world. I did that by betting that growing inequality would destroy the American and British economies forever, that there would never be a meaningful recovery, and that living standards would fall–forever, interminably.”
      https://fortune.com/2022/09/29/rich-betting-inequality-uk-budget-truss-destroy-us-uk-sorry-finance-economy-politics-international-gary-stevenson/
      .
      “He made his first million when he was 24, betting on the outcome of Greece’s financial crisis in 2011. He was a senior economist at Citibank, and placed a series of bets that would pay out if global inequality increased. The bets made him, he claims, the most profitable Citibank trader in the world that year, earning it $35m. He made the same bet on yawning inequality in 2012: again, it paid out. “
      https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/apr/03/raise-my-taxes-now-the-millionaires-who-want-to-give-it-all-away

      • Yet he makes some valid points about economics education today. Many from all sides would agree that it basically involves “memorising and regurgitating algebra” which does not really lead to a proper understanding of capitalism.

        People in the financial sector do have something to say because they understand asset markets and how monetary policy actually effects them. Peopel like Stevenson warned that the effect of massive liquidity injections (QE) would be to increase income inequality, for the very simple reason that the wealthy are the only people able to buy assets like government bonds and this would only act to increase the wealth of the already asset-rich. He knew this would happen because he could see what was happening in the trading rooms. By contrast neo-classical economics has a lot of algebraic abstraction about how the monetary sector works with absolutely nothing to do with how it actually does work. And to be honest with you most economists would not have a clue how it works, even monetary ones!

        Sure traders are not the people I want to see running the economy, and the financial sector in my view needs to be severely reigned back. But don’t miss the forest for the trees. I have no problems with people with a real world understanding of the financial markets making a contribution and giving their insights where relevant.

        Stevenson by the way is in favour of a wealth tax and a major redistribution of wealth away from the very wealthy. Personally I do not think that that is even enough, but clearly he is no longer working to enrich himself or wealthy clients. I can think of some historical episodes where in the end a major redistribution of wealth and reform of capitalism took place, and this in the end what enabled capitalism and society to recover. Unfortunately an awful amount of tragedy and destruction occurred before this did occur.

        Let’s hope we avoid that this time.

  2. Debates among economists regarding consumer theory are exceedingly tedious.
    But Samuelson was right to advise Prof. Syll that he “must not believe that it was all redundant fuss about not very much.”

    It may indeed be true, as alleged in this post, that:
    – Samuelson’s revealed preference theory is “logically equivalent to the old one”, ie the standard preference-based/utility theory of consumer behaviour.
    – “There is in practice no direct test of the preference hypothesis”
    – There are “a considerable number of violations of the revealed preference axioms”
    – A consumer’s “choices are not rigidly bound to his own preferences only”
    – The concept of “utility” lacks of precise definition.
    .
    These points indicate that conclusions based on consumer demand theory may be only approximations or indicative in character, and that in some cases such conclusions may even be misleading.
    .
    However, these criticisms are insufficient to justify the sweeping conclusion that utility is an “improper concept”, or to warrant the complete disregard of consumers’ preferences by producers and governments.
    Consideration of the welfare/utility of consumers (eg consumer surplus) is vital in cost-benefit comparisons for many government policy alternatives, eg in the fields of transport, taxation, health.

    • If you consider the (unreported and assumed away) margins of error of the statistics used to inform public policy, is it any wonder we end up with Wars on Drugs and homelessness, both based on standard mainstream supply and demand theories and both spectacular failures due to unintended consequences arising due to ignored error terms?

    • Post marketing clip board said what.

    • Most pertinent were comments like:“the fact that man is a social animal and his choices are not rigidly bound to his own preferences only”. To understand social utility we need to understand and properly define first what a society actually is. If you want to take the Utilitarian definition of it, you have to properly justify why.

      Consumer surplus should not be confused with public financing – which is merely accounting. Consumer surplus is a tautological representation of something fundamentally questionable.

      • “Consumer surplus is a tautological representation of something fundamentally questionable.”

        Which then begs the question about Epistemological ownership advanced by some, by dint of some self proclaimed authority = unquestionable = empiric.

        I would further the thought that the quote above is in reference to a market society and not a social society. This then begs the question about the framework and its relevancy in terms, are they applicable in both cases and if not why. Hence my quip about post marketing.

        It is in this that I can delineate between our good host Lars and say Kingsley&Co. Lars exhibits social tenancies through his altruism in his personal life and his objectivity towards others, where as the latter is more fundamental about some predisposed notions consumed[tm] about reality and how we are all supposed to function with in it.

        That ball was rolling even before I was born and that was in 61.

  3. My question, which ChatGPT just answers by going in neoclassical circles, is: if you are a financial trader and execute a defined risk trade involving several options, can you engineer it so you have no preference on A or B’s price movement, because you will profit either way? Would the inclusion of actual, observable hedging instruments in Samuelson’s model lead to irrational, arbitrary prices?

    • “which ChatGPT just answers by going in neoclassical circles”

      Neo-classical economics is basically about tautology. It’s doing its job exceptionally well.

  4. Did you leave Twitter? I can’t locate you there today.
    – – John Lounsbury

    • Strange. No problem here!

      • Finally found you and retweeted two tweets. (:-)

  5. There is a quote that is quite revealing:
    “[t]he whole theory of consumer’s behavior can thus be based upon operationally meaningful foundations in terms of revealed preference”

    The revealing feature is the word “consumer’s”. What it reveals is a conflation between consumer’s and consumers, representative of a common flaw in economic logic.
    – – John Lounsbury

  6. The whole point of Samuelson’s “pioneering work” was to restore a field of idiot savants that does not know how to question, is ahistorical and gets into debates about things that don’t even exist.

    So indeed we get a lot of fuss about nothing.

    The consequences though are serious: it undid what good work was achieved in the wake of the Great Depression and WWII and restored power to capital and other areas of concentrated power and wealth.

    And we now face the prospect of a return to very dangerous times.

    • I think regardless of ones view on the currant conflict, dominating head lines, is the economic reality of how many no longer have the Mfg capacity or the means to mobilize Mfg capacity, due too the past economics, that those like Samuelson et al promoted, in response to an unforeseen need. That would indicate a failure at the sovereign level. So I ask, what perception one would want in economics given this level of failure. Especially since the amount of money could be better spent on social goods and not external adventurism.


Sorry, the comment form is closed at this time.

Blog at WordPress.com.
Entries and Comments feeds.