Bayesianism — a patently absurd approach to science

16 Mar, 2021 at 16:12 | Posted in Theory of Science & Methodology | 17 Comments

Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal - BayesianMainstream economics nowadays usually assumes that agents that have to make choices under conditions of uncertainty behave according to Bayesian rules (preferably the ones axiomatised by Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937) or Savage (1954)) — that is, they maximise expected utility with respect to some subjective probability measure that is continually updated according to Bayes theorem. If not, they are supposed to be irrational, and ultimately — via some “Dutch book” or “money pump” argument — susceptible to being ruined by some clever “bookie”.

Bayesianism reduces questions of rationality to questions of internal consistency (coherence) of beliefs, but — even granted this questionable reductionism — do rational agents really have to be Bayesian? However, there are no strong warrants for believing so.

In many of the situations that are relevant to economics, one could argue that there is simply not enough of adequate and relevant information to ground beliefs of a probabilistic kind, and that in those situations it is not really possible, in any relevant way, to represent an individual’s beliefs in a single probability measure.

Say you have come to learn (based on own experience and tons of data) that the probability of you becoming unemployed in the US is 10%. Having moved to another country (where you have no own experience and no data) you have no information on unemployment and a fortiori nothing to help you construct any probability estimate on. A Bayesian would, however, argue that you would have to assign probabilities to the mutually exclusive alternative outcomes and that these have to add up to 1​ if you are rational. That is, in this case — and based on symmetry — a rational individual would have to assign probability 10% to become unemployed and 90% to become employed.

bayes_dog_tshirtThat feels intuitively wrong though, and I guess most people would agree. Bayesianism cannot distinguish between symmetry-based probabilities from information and symmetry-based probabilities from an absence of information. In these kinds of situations, most of us would rather say that it is simply irrational to be a Bayesian and better instead to admit that we “simply do not know” or that we feel ambiguous and undecided. Arbitrary an ungrounded probability claims are more irrational than being undecided in face of genuine uncertainty, so if there is not sufficient information to ground a probability distribution it is better to acknowledge that simpliciter, rather than pretending to possess a certitude that we simply do not possess.

We live in a world permeated by unmeasurable uncertainty – not quantifiable stochastic risk – which often forces us to make decisions based on anything but rational expectations. Sometimes we ‘simply do not know.’ There are no strong reasons why we should accept the Bayesian view of modern mainstream economists, according to whom expectations “tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction of the theory.” As argued by Keynes, we rather base our expectations on the confidence or “weight” we put on different events and alternatives. Expectations are a question of weighing probabilities by ‘degrees of belief,’ beliefs that standardly have preciously little to do with the kind of stochastic probabilistic calculations made by the rational agents modelled by mainstream economists.

Back in 1991, when yours truly earned his first PhD with a dissertation on decision making and rationality in social choice theory and game theory, I concluded that “repeatedly it seems as though mathematical tractability and elegance — rather than realism and relevance — have been the most applied guidelines for the behavioural assumptions being made. On a political and social level, it is doubtful if the methodological individualism, ahistoricity and formalism they are advocating are especially valid.”

This, of course, was like swearing in church. My mainstream colleagues were — to say the least — not exactly überjoyed.

One of my inspirations when working on that dissertation was Henry Kyburg, and I still think his critique is the ultimate take-down of Bayesian hubris:

bFrom the point of view of the “logic of consistency”, no set of beliefs is more rational than any other, so long as they both satisfy the quantitative relationships expressed by the fundamental laws of probability. Thus I am free to assign the number 1/3 to the probability that the sun will rise tomorrow; or, more cheerfully, to take the probability to be 9/10 that I have a rich uncle in Australia who will send me a telegram tomorrow informing me that he has made me his sole heir. Neither Ramsey, nor Savage, nor de Finetti, to name three leading figures in the personalistic movement, can find it in his heart to detect any logical shortcomings in anyone, or to find anyone logically culpable, whose degrees of belief in various propositions satisfy the laws of the probability calculus, however odd those degrees of belief may otherwise be …

Now this seems patently absurd. It is to suppose that even the most simple statistical inferences have no logical weight where my beliefs are concerned. It is perfectly compatible with these laws that I should have a degree of belief equal to 1/4 that this coin will land heads when next I toss it; and that I should then perform a long series of tosses (say, 1000), of which 3/4 should result in heads; and then that on the 1001st toss, my belief in heads should be unchanged at 1/4 …

Henry E. Kyburg

17 Comments

  1. @ skippy:
    .
    Fama writes:
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    “New information, in turn, should ultimately reflect changes in the underlying
    economic conditions that determine equilibrium prices in speculative markets.”
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    This is a laugh. Traders trade on all sorts of non-fundamental “information”. If I know big players are currently shorting Treasuries I can try to momentum-trade with them, or fade them and hope to instigate a short squeeze by, perhaps, getting WallStreetBets to buy TLT calls in enough volume to get market makers to force a gamma squeeze.
    .
    Trader joke: “What are fundamentals? Whatever does not move price.”
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    Fama is wildly out of touch with how actual traders trade.
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    Anyway, you can recreate fat-tailed Paretian distributions with options. If you predict prices will have fat tails you can buy (or sell) deep out-the-money calls and puts to recreate a payoff function that matches your theory-derived prediction.
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    This you can use Black-Scholes-Merton-priced options to implement Fama’s distribution predictions. Fama should do that, and report back to us his Profit and Loss on the trades.
    .
    Fama continues:
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    “The variability of a given expected yield is higher in a stable Paretian market than it would be in a Gaussian market, and the probability of large losses is greater”.
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    But you can use options strategies that pay off as variability (or volatility) rises.
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    “In every case the empirical distributions were long-tailed, that is, they contained many more observations in their extreme tail areas than would be expected under a hypothesis of normality.”
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    Then you can buy VXX, or UVXY, or options on those …

    • In case you missed the point, the book came out in the early 60s, yet most were still operating on faulty assumptions which resulted in you know what. Now post events some have tweaked things a little bit thinking they have it all covered now, albeit history constantly reminds us just the opposite. The issue here is who wares the consequences of those actions by a few, not the actions of themselves in the near or short term when risk inverts and goes manifold in the blink of any eye.

      .

      You might like Gates friction less Capitalism because of personal gain and ideological biases, yet that transfers no rights or authority in exposing others to its risk[s.

      .

      This is why you detest price stability because it meddles with volatility, not that anyone would create it in the first place or anything.

      .

      The point stands that the market was playing with fire when the facts were contrary to what was blindly accepted, only for short term reasons, psychology better explains that path dependency than post hoc rhetoric.

      • “The issue here is who wares the consequences of those actions by a few, not the actions of themselves in the near or short term when risk inverts and goes manifold in the blink of any eye.”
        .
        The Fed bears the consequences, which means there are none since the Fed prints money to solve crises.
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        “the market was playing with fire”
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        The Fed has an unlimited supply of liquidity to put out fires.

        • Not relevant to the post or our conversation and if you have issues with CBs being administered by quasi monetarists and politicians taking notes from mainstream economics your above thread comment makes no reference.

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          Per your last comment … depends where its at.

          • The relevance is that no one need bear the cost of insuring financial panics.

    • Robert,
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      The bright sparks at Long Term Capital Management totally believed in Black and Scholes and Mr. Fama.
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      The crisis they engendered brought the world financial system absolutely to its knees.
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      The notion that the CBs of the world can be saviours of last resort and backstop these crazy trades you recommend is disturbing and absurd.
      .
      Better to do whatever to avoid a crisis in the first place, such as eschewing these crazy trades that you recommend altogether.

      • LTCM was easily bailed out.
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        “Better to do whatever to avoid a crisis in the first place, such as eschewing these crazy trades that you recommend altogether.”
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        The problem is the regulations have worse effects than the crazy trades. Glass-Steagal did not prevent LTCM’s bets.
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        The best policy is to insure everyone with a basic income, then you could let big institutions fail and have the Fed make sure ATMs keep working.
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        You want to use sticks. I want to use carrots …

      • “Glass-Steagal did not prevent LTCM’s bets.”
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        OK. So a bigger stick is required. Ban the trades involved. The world used to survive without them. These trades feed a bloated financial industry which serves little societal good.
        .
        Your recipe for crisis management is totally insane and absurd. Not only would big institutions fail, little people would be hurt and hurt badly. You have no conception of the catastrophe resulting from what you are blithely proposing.
        .
        Carrots are for bunnies.

      • Little ol’ me is hurt much more by your harmful economic models that call for draconian, violence-enforced bans on nonviolent trading behavior. Your sticks whack me, while the big guys pay off regulators to keep getting away with whatever it is you want to ban.
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        The innovation of finance is that everyone can win because money is emergent and expands through financial trading.
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        Traditional economists blind themselves to this obvious fact, and prescribe hardship and needless austerity on me while not hurting the big guys in the least.
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        Your policies are more harmful than free markets. Your policies stifle and control. Your policies demonstrate a failure of imagination about how money is created.
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        Sticks are for stuck-ups.

        • “Sticks are for stuck-ups.”
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          LOL

        • Henry, I thought of this argument just now when I was researching XVZ which is a volatility Exchange-Traded Note that supposedly does not decay like VXX. How can you just ban these innovations without understanding them? Economists still think supply and demand determines prices but supply and demand for XVZ does not affect its price (the same is true of any ETF or ETN). If I buy or sell XVZ, even in quantity, it doesn’t move the price. If I buy XVZ, I am buying insurance against a sudden decline in the S&P 500 index, such as occurred in March of 2020. Is that a crazy trade? Or just something policy makers fear because they don’t understand how it works?
          .
          I’m still bitter about not being able to recoup my GME cost basis by selling a deep out-the-money call. As it turns out the call I wanted to buy expired worthless, so I would have got to keep the premium, which was exactly equal to what I paid for my single GME share. The lesson: those with access to selling calls could have hedged their GME longs. Was that a crazy trade that macroprudential policies were justified in banning me from, or do policy makers have too heavy a hand, forcing me to book a GME loss (there still may be plays I can make to recoup my cost basis) when I could easily have erased my loss?
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          In short I think you have to understand enough about what you are regulating that you avoid hurting little investors while the large players continue to do what they want. Simply dismissing my trade strategies as ‘crazy’ reveals more about your ignorance of financial markets than it says about the trades themselves. Economists owe it to us to learn enough about financial innovations that they can understand defined-risk trades, before they start recklessly proposing more regulations which are highly likely to have adverse consequences on small investors.
          .
          My goal is to use financial markets to make enough money to buy up logging contracts and not log the trees. Is that a crazy trade idea that threatens your physical safety, or should I be free to pursue my happiness by trying to destroy capitalism, nonviolently, from within?

        • Robert,
          .
          There is a place for derivatives. They can protect portfolios when markets are turning (if you can find the other side and you have the turn picked correctly). They can supplement portfolio incomes (if you pick the trend correctly)..
          .
          They can also be used to manipulate markets as in the case of GME. Market players can have a heft which enables them to manipulate markets. Regulators have to be concerned about these things. They endeavour to protect markets from such activity and some people will get hurt.
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          You were playing a high risk dangerous game messing about in a highly volatile play in a hot house environment. If you want to play that game then you have to accept the risks, market and regulatory.
          .
          Running bets on bets on bets etc. can be destabilizing in extreme circumstances, imperiling the system. Having a last resort bailout facility (the Central Bank) is not a solution. Much damage can be wreaked before the system is stabilized.
          .
          As far as I am concerned the financial industry is bloated and uses talent and resources which could be better deployed for societal goals.
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          It exists because the huge income and wealth mal-distribution of the last 50 years has left a few with massive wealth which they have no idea what to do with. They end up playing games which threaten financial systems and the real economy.
          .
          “Your policies demonstrate a failure of imagination about how money is created.”
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          Some of your ideas on inflation are insane. And please spare us the suggestions regarding inflation indexing and protective derivatives. Go back and study the hyperinflation of the 1970s. I remember the time well. It was a time of great uncertainty. Businessmen were not willing to invest and make plans for the future. The average person had no idea how to manage their expenditures and savings.

        • Henry, I lived through the 1970s. Your characterization of it as hyperinflation is insane.
          .
          Volcker wanted to kill indexation. Israel had used indexation for decades successfully. The choice to kill COLAs was as wrong as choosing to defend the gold standard in the 1930s.
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          My policies will become standard, just as many of the Greenback Party’s “insane” policy proposals in the 1870s have now become standard.
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          You can hold back progress only so long with harmful, blinkered, theory-driven, cruelly austere regulatory policies.
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          “Businessmen were not willing to invest and make plans for the future.”
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          Inflation swaps solve this problem.
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          “The average person had no idea how to manage their expenditures and savings.”
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          Why not pay inflation as interest on individual Fed accounts, to more directly transmit monetary policy by encouraging individuals to save in inflationary times?

  2. This reminds me of equivalent current practice of trading warrants for new stock issues. Traders apply Black Scholes options pricing theory to establish value for an asset with zero trading history, therefore zero knowledge of volatility, and so using some ad hoc estimate for volatility as an important model input based on pure arm waving instead. It’s nuts.

    • I instantly thought of the recent example where a mathematician pitched to some investors the idea of owning the dominate share of lottery tickets, through a low cost broad base buying program. It worked every time it was used and caused a bit of a drama until the rules were changed to disallow this method.

    • Is there any pricing formula that is less arbitrary?
      .
      At least Black in “Noise” acknowledges that prices are only within a factor of two of fundamental value. But the “two” is arbitrary, and 10% of the time price deviates even more than the arbitrary factor of two.
      .
      So you’re left with one of the originators of the key pricing formula in paper markets saying prices are arbitrary. Every trader knows “price is a liar”. Thus the whole “efficient markets hypothesis” is basically thrown out by finance …

      • Mandelbrot and the Stable Paretian Hypothesis was printed when again?


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