Roy Bhaskar

5 Aug, 2019 at 10:58 | Posted in Theory of Science & Methodology | 13 Comments

royWhat properties do societies possess that might make them possible objects of knowledge for us? My strategy in developing an answer to this question will be effectively based on a pincer movement. But in deploying the pincer I shall concentrate first on the ontological question of the properties that societies possess, before shifting to the epistemological question of how these properties make them possible objects of knowledge for us. This is not an arbitrary order of development. It reflects the condition that, for transcendental realism, it is the nature of objects that determines their cognitive possibilities for us; that, in nature, it is humanity that is contingent and knowledge, so to speak, accidental. Thus it is because sticks and stones are solid that they can be picked up and thrown, not because they can be picked up and thrown that they are solid (though that they can be handled in this sort of way may be a contingently necessary condition for our knowledge of their solidity).

No philosopher of science has influenced yours truly’s thinking more than Roy did, and in a time when scientific relativism is still on the march, it is important to keep up his claim for not reducing science to a pure discursive level.

Roy-Bhaskar-009Science is made possible by the fact that there exists a reality beyond our theories and concepts of it. It is this reality that our theories in some way deal with. Contrary to positivism, I cannot see that the main task of science is to detect event-regularities between observed facts. Rather, the task must be conceived as identifying the underlying structure and forces that produce the observed events.

The problem with positivist social science is not that it gives the wrong answers, but rather that in a strict sense it does not give answers at all. Its explanatory models presuppose that the social reality is ‘closed,’ and since social reality is fundamentally ‘open,’ models of that kind cannot explain anything about​ what happens in such a universe. Positivist social science has to postulate closed conditions to make its models operational and then – totally unrealistically – impute these closed conditions to society’s real structure.

What makes knowledge in social sciences possible is the fact that society consists of social structures and positions that influence the individuals of society, partly through their being the necessary prerequisite for the actions of individuals but also because they dispose individuals to act (within a given structure) in a certain way. These structures constitute the ‘deep structure’ of society.

Our observations and theories are concept-dependent without therefore necessarily being concept-determined. There is a reality existing independently of our knowledge and theories of it. Although we cannot apprehend it without using our concepts and theories, these are not the same as reality itself. Reality and our concepts of it are not identical. Social science is made possible by existing structures and relations in society that are continually reproduced and transformed by different actors.

Explanations and predictions of social phenomena require theory constructions. Just looking for correlations between events is not enough. One has to get under the surface and see the deeper underlying structures and mechanisms that essentially constitute the social system.

The basic question one has to pose when studying social relations and events are​ what are the fundamental relations without which they would cease to exist. The answer will point to causal mechanisms and tendencies that act in the concrete contexts we study. Whether these mechanisms are activated and what effects they will have in that case it is not possible to predict, since these depend on accidental and variable relations. Every social phenomenon is determined by a host of both necessary and contingent relations, and it is impossible in practice to have complete knowledge of these constantly changing relations. That is also why we can never confidently predict them. What we can do, through learning about the mechanisms of the structures of society, is to identify the driving forces behind them, thereby making it possible to indicate the direction in which things tend to develop.

The world itself should never be conflated with the knowledge we have of it. Science can only produce meaningful, relevant and realist knowledge if it acknowledges its dependence of the​ world out there. Ultimately that also means that the critique yours truly wages against mainstream economics is that it doesn’t take that ontological requirement seriously.

13 Comments

  1. The problem I have with asking, “What properties do societies possess that might make them possible objects of knowledge for us?” is that it seems to be a leading question, a question that leads us unthinkingly into accepting the legitimacy of explanatory strategies that privilege social causes for social effects. This is not about linearity or additivity or the other problems of a too-simple dust bowl empiricism. It is a fundamental hazard that attends the project of defining “society” as an object of study and seeking for “society” its own apparatus of explanatory categories.
    .
    The pseudo-physics of neoclassical economics, in which the mathematical analysis of equilibrium of forces was imported without proper derivations from actual economic constraints, is a kind of Type I error, in which proper consideration of the complexity as well as distinctive qualities of social phenomena are short-circuited.
    .
    But, it seems quite possible, even probable that a corresponding kind of Type II error entangles any effort to lift a social science out of venturing ad hoc social explanations.
    .
    In a world in which lead in gasoline can cause a crime wave, the account we construct of “causes” in an open system has to be open to the actual causes, and not just the disciplinary correct types of cause. The criminologist who insists on ignoring atmospheric chemistry for child-rearing practices or policing strategies or demographics is relying on an explanatory strategy that prejudices the case. This is severely problematic.

    Comment by Bruce Wilder— 7 Aug, 2019 #

  2. i think there are a lot of valid criticisms of Positivism and I think you would be hard pressed to find a major figure in philosophy of science today who would fully defend Positivism. However, the word covers a lot of territory and a lot of people. So firstly, when people criticize Positivism, I think it’s helpful to be a little more specific. Secondly, while I would agree that covering law explanations are not necessarily the entirety of scientific explanation, I don’t know how we would do without it. If you read Hempel’s actual articulation of covering law explanations, i think you will see that at least for Hempel, he did think it should address actual properties of the objects we are studying: here is a link to Hempel’s articulation in the original: http://fitelson.org/woodward/hempel_tm.pdf . It is interesting and ironic that he references Dewey but also illustrates that Dewey’s views are not necessarily inconsistent with covering law explanations. Thirdly, I think people should distinguish between the kinds of models that mainstream economists develop, and the kinds of theories that Hempel advocated. I think that Joan Robinson was actually closer to the Positivists than Samuelson and I would also point out that though Keynes was not a Positivist, some of the influences on how we approaches certain aspects of The General Theory clearly show some influence from Russell and others who were loosely affiliated with the Vienna Circle. Just to be clear, I’m not an advocate for the Vienna Circle.

    Comment by Citizen Rat— 6 Aug, 2019 #

  3. Those who disdain philosophy reveal a certain blindness regarding their own unconscious philosophical assumptions. Lars is making an effort to make his own philosophical assumptions explicit. All science is done by persons who bring their own biases, values, and philosophical assumptions into their work, more or less, depending on the nature of the problem domain in question. Relativism is a philosophical position not a scientific fact. The question Lars raises are legitimate and perennial.

    https://motanomics.com/2019/07/13/quantum-mechanics-and-human-values/

    https://motanomics.com/2019/07/29/a-pragmatic-view-of-truth/

    Comment by Meta Capitalism— 6 Aug, 2019 #

  4. The maintenance of a market economy involves a basic paradox. For centuries writers such as Adam Smith have argued that the workings of the market should be based on the individual pursuit of self-interest. Yet, if the pursuit of self-interest goes too far in society, the very existence of the market may itself be endangered. If “opportunistic” behavior encompasses too many forms of social action, as seen in recent years in Russia, a market economy may function very poorly.* There is a wide range of behavior—including dishonest and “corrupt” transactions within the institutional framework of the market, “rent seeking” in government policy and administration, and actions that destroy trust in the legal system—that have the potential for undermining the efficient workings of markets.
    .
    Although few economists have so argued, it may be that finding a satisfactory resolution of the conflicting roles of self-interest in society—those areas where it can be encouraged and other areas where it must be actively discouraged—is more important to economic outcomes than the technical knowledge provided by economists. The formal idea of “social capital” traces back at least to James Coleman, who wrote in 1987 that “social norms constitute social capital.”1 In the 1990s there has been a growing literature in economics as well that emphasizes the importance of social capital in determining economic outcomes.2 Some leading social scientists now assert that the social form of capital may be equally or more important to economic performance as compared with physical and human forms of capital.3 A number of recent commentators have stated that a culture of “trust” is an essential element in maintaining a successful market (or other) economic system.4 One of the most respected economists of the past fifty years (and winner in 1972 of the Nobel Prize in economics), Kenneth Arrow, recently declared that economists in the future will routinely have to incorporate new forms of analysis of “social variables”—objects of analysis on which the traditional individualistic assumptions of ordinary economic thinking may shed little light.5″ (Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond” by Robert H. Nelson, http://a.co/ihr1tRP)

    That requires a recognition of the role of agents such as lobbyists, politicians, and evev preachers who mix politics and market fundamentalism creating the abomination we see in Trumpism and his crony kleptocracy. Something mainstream economics had utterly failed to do.

    Comment by Meta Capitalism— 6 Aug, 2019 #

  5. It would be good, and I agree with Kingsley here, to have some more specific examples.

    Comment by Meta Capitalism— 6 Aug, 2019 #

  6. Sorry Kinglsley, your verbiage doesn’t make sense to me. Your claim is vague and dogmatic, in my view. Humans flourish (or not for complex reasons) and it is BS to claim they “scientific relativism” is the reason. The devil is in the details 🙂

    Comment by Meta Capitalism— 6 Aug, 2019 #

    • There is a difference between “relativism” and Einstein’s theory of Relativity. The former is not what his theory was about. That which is invariant across referent frames is the real, according to Einstein’s own view. In Nagoya now, but when return home can provide citation.

      Comment by Meta Capitalism— 6 Aug, 2019 #

  7. If I was to distill the jargon into a few words, personal reality matters; mind (and associated free will) has an impact in both material reality and other minds (persons) and is socially relational, and becomes a cause of transforming cultures; healthy social relationships flourish when they embody reciprocity, trust, and mutual concern for self and others.

    That is my understanding. I find even Bhaskar’s philosophy needs some under-labouring to remove some loose rubbish, but that is another story …

    Comment by Meta Capitalism— 6 Aug, 2019 #

  8. ” Rather, the task must be conceived as identifying the underlying structure and forces that produce the observed events.”
    .
    How is this done other than by observation?
    .
    How is that epistemological limitations can be eliminated such as to enable ontological discernment?

    Comment by Henry Rech— 6 Aug, 2019 #

  9. “Science is made possible by the fact that there exists a reality beyond our theories and concepts of it.”
    .
    That is just a story …

    Comment by Robert S Mitchell— 6 Aug, 2019 #

  10. @Meta Capitalism
    It seems that the point of my comment was not clear, so let me be more explicit.
    .
    At 5’10” in the video Bhaskar describes a peculiar notion of “seriousness”, namely the “unity of theory and practice”.
    The point of my comment is that there is no “practice” of transcendental critical realism despite many pages “theory”.
    The proof of the pudding is in the eating, not in the recipe.
    .
    At 4’50” in the video Bhaskar says that “exploring a world of trust and solidarity in the philosophy of meta-reality allows us to identify here and now a world which can form the basis for a society of universal human flourishing”.
    Terrific verbiage!
    But can you or anyone else do this “here and now”?
    Or maybe you can reference an example which illustrates how these concepts are successfully applied here on Earth?
    If you can’t, then surely we must abandon metaphysical daaydreams and instead stick with what Prof. Syll calls ” scientific relativism”, which has actually delivered ” human flourishing”.

    Comment by Kingsley Lewis— 6 Aug, 2019 #

  11. It seems there is a lack of seriousness of unity of theory and practice in your thoughtless caricature Lewis. These are not normal times, and patterns of consumption and saving may well not for follow past patterns, especially if Trump’s hot trade war turns into a hot real war.

    Your facile remark sets you with the best:

    “There’s no better reason to leave the building by the ground floor than by the second floor window.”

    Comment by Meta Capitalism— 5 Aug, 2019 #

  12. “The basic question one has to pose when studying social relations and events are​ what are the fundamental relations without which they would cease to exist.”
    .
    Unfortunately Prof. Syll never gives illustrations of his theories.
    So let us try to do this for ourselves.
    Let us consider Keynes’ fundamental prsycological law, the consumption function.
    According to Prof. Syll we must ask: “What would happen if this ceased to exist?
    In this event some of the possible “fundamental relations” include:
    – Zero consumption, i.e. we are all die.
    – Random consumption, i.e. we are all crazy.
    – Consumption related to sun-spot activity.
    – All of the above.
    .
    Is such nonsense helping us to discover “the deeper underlying structures and mechanisms that essentially constitute the social system”?

    Comment by Kingsley Lewis— 5 Aug, 2019 #


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