The deficit myth

2 Jun, 2024 at 10:55 | Posted in Economics | 10 Comments

In modern times legal currencies are totally based on fiat. Currencies no longer have intrinsic value (such as gold and silver). What gives them value is basically the simple fact that you have to pay your taxes with them. That also enables governments to run a kind of monopoly business where they never can run out of money. A fortiori, spending becomes the prime mover, and taxing and borrowing are degraded to following acts. If we have a depression, the solution, then, is not austerity. It is spending. Budget deficits are not a major problem since fiat money means that governments can always make more of them.​

Twitter \ Modern Money Memes (ModernMoneyMeme@)In the mainstream economist’s world, we don’t need fiscal policy other than when interest rates hit their lower bound (ZLB). In normal times monetary policy suffices. The central banks simply adjust the interest rate to achieve full employment without inflation. If governments in that situation take on larger budget deficits, these tend to crowd out private spending and the interest rates get higher.

What mainstream economists have in mind when they argue this way, is nothing but a version of Say’s law, basically saying that savings have to equal investments and that if the state increases investments, then private investments have to come down (‘crowding out’). As an accounting identity, there is, of course, nothing to say about the law, but as such, it is also totally uninteresting from an economic point of view. What happens when ex-ante savings and investments differ, is that we basically get output adjustments. GDP changes and so makes saving and investments equal ex-post. And this, nota bene, says nothing at all about the success or failure of fiscal policies!

MMT rejects the traditional Phillips curve inflation-unemployment trade-off and has a less positive evaluation of traditional policy measures to reach full employment. Instead of a general increase in aggregate demand, it usually prefers more ‘structural’ and directed demand measures with less risk of producing increased inflation. At full employment, deficit spending will often be inflationary, but that is not what should decide the fiscal position of the government. The size of public debt and deficits is not — as already Abba Lerner argued with his ‘functional finance’ theory in the 1940s — a policy objective. The size of public debt and deficits are what they are when we try to fulfil our basic economic objectives — full employment and price stability.

Governments can spend whatever amount of money they want. That does not mean that MMT says they ought to — that’s something our politicians have to decide. No MMTer denies that too much government spending can be inflationary. What is questioned is that government deficits necessarily is inflationary.

All real economic activities depend on a functioning financial machinery. But institutional arrangements, states of confidence, fundamental uncertainties, asymmetric expectations, the banking system, financial intermediation, loan granting processes, default risks, liquidity constraints, aggregate debt, cash flow fluctuations, etc., etc. — things that play decisive roles in channelling money/savings/credit — are more or less left in the dark in modern mainstream formalizations of economic theory.

Can a government go bankrupt?
No. You cannot be indebted to yourself.

Can a central bank go bankrupt?
No. A central bank can in principle always ‘print’ more money.

Do taxpayers have to repay government debts?
No, at least not as long the debt is incurred in a country’s own currency.

Do increased public debts burden future generations?
No, not necessarily. It depends on what the debt is used for.

Does maintaining full employment mean the government has to increase its debt?
No.

dec3bb27f72875e4fb4d4b62daebb2fd161b36392c1a0626f00cfd2ece207d84As the national debt increases, and with it the sum of private wealth, there will be an increasingly yield from taxes on higher incomes and inheritances, even if the tax rates are unchanged. These higher tax payments do not represent reductions of spending by the taxpayers. Therefore the government does not have to use these proceeds to maintain the requisite rate of spending, and can devote them to paying the interest on the national debt …

The greater the national debt the greater is the quantity of private wealth. The reason for this is simply that for every dollar of debt owed by the government there is a private creditor who owns the government obligations (possibly through a corporation in which he has shares), and who regards these obligations as part of his private fortune. The greater the private fortunes the less is the incentive to add to them by saving out of current income …

If for any reason the government does not wish to see private property grow too much … it can check this by taxing the rich instead of borrowing from them, in its program of financing government spending to maintain full employment.

Abba Lerner

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  1. Richard Murphy:

    Samuelson on the legacy we leave for grandchildren

    Posted on February 3 2024

    “Paul Samuelson, the author of what still might be the most-sold textbook of the post-war era had this to say on page 427 of his first edition, addressing a subject then very close to the thoughts of many of his readers:

    Can it be truthfully said that “internal borrowing shifts the war burden to future generations while taxing places it on the present generation”? A thousand times no! The present generation must still give up resources to produce the munitions hurled at the enemy. In the future, some of our grandchildren will be giving up goods and services to other grandchildren. That is the nub of the matter. The only way in which we can impose a direct burden on the future nation as a whole is by incurring an external debt or by passing along less capital equipment to our posterity. … “https://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2024/02/03/samuelson-on-the-legacy-we-leave-for-grandchildren/

    • Interesting — but also somewhat confusing when considering what Samuelson says here!

      • Indeed Lars!! Very confusing! As you know, I have no great admiration for Paul Samuelson, that man seems to have had a very fluid volatile, not to say opportunistic way of thinking about economics,apparently! I Know that at the time when this was written, Samuelson spent a lot of time with Abba Lerner, could it possibly have had some influence on what he wrote here? But that qoute from Paul Samuelson, at least show that even in the most mainstream economics center a more sober, reality based view of national debt was more common. And I don’t think Richard Murphy has any great appreciation for Paul A Samuelson either since he wrote this obituary about him:

        “Richard Murphy-Paul Samuelson has died. A Nobel laureate economist he has a lot to answer for, and his legacy (eulogised in the FT by the BBC’s Stephanie Flanders) is pretty dire.

        He, more than most mathematised economics. Which means he had to assume people were rational. In the process he broke the link between economics and reality.

        Then he assumed the existence of stable equilibria in an economy – which is contrary to all known evidence. So once more he remeoved economics from the realms of usefulness.

        And he wrote a textbook that has created more bad economists dedicated to harming the society in which they live than almost any other.

        So what he got a Nobel prize? His legacy is dire.” http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2009/12/14/paul-samuelson-dies-an-economist-with-an-outsnading-debt-to-societyo-a-science-dies/

    • I agree with Samuelson that internal imbalance is generally only a problem for most countries if you also have an external imbalance (and therefore you are dependent on raising that debt in international capital markets – and then likely if you are an emerging market to become a hostage to them).

      But a hegemonic power with the reserve currency can simultaneously go into internal and external imbalance: There will still be infinite demand for the USD, however much they print it, and it will be remain a safe-haven currency as long as that condition is met.

      The problem for hegemons and their world monetary arrangements is when their power declines relative to others. This is seen through events such as a loss of control over trade routes or their ability to force countries like Saudi Arabia to sell oil in dollars, or their ability to demand that allies like Japan maintain exchange rates or USD denominated bond holdings that are not directly in their own domestic interests, or force allies to support wars that are designed to maintain its hegemony.

      Neo-classical economists do not understand and are not interested in understanding the most basic of things, even what a currency means. For a start it is a adjective as well as a noun. A “currency” has to have “currency”. And that is ultimately a reflection of the integrity of a state, including its ability to defend itself. (Surprisingly actually, despite his gadgets, this is something that Robert Mundelll actually understood and wrote about.)

      We probably have at least another 10-20 years of complete dollar dominance. But with a 33 trillion USD debt that is a problem.

      Things change slowly…until they don’t.

      • Mundell seemed to have eschewed a lot of his gadgets in later life and became more of a monetary historian. He was in favour of the Euro and argued in favour of a return to the Gold Standard – quite opposite to what his Optimum Currency Area theory and open economy ISLM would suggest. I am not a Mundell fan. But the contradiction is interesting.

      • On the international economic consequences of large scale US government debt accumulation. Here inflation is understood as a discrepancy between output and monetary growth.

      • A no-nonsense Marxian take on what massive US debt accumulation actually means:

  2. Michael Hudson makes some interesting observations in this video on how huge accumulations of debt, including sovereign debt, are linked to the increased concentrations of wealth and power which ultimately undermine productive capacity and create irreperable division between an increasingly oligarchic political and financial class and the rest of society, and ultimately ending the hegemony itself (from 38).

  3. MMT’s great weakness is that it never comes to grips with the economic functions of a vast, marketable national debt. Governments do not “print” money so much as they “print” marketable debt. The banking system does “print” money either; it creates credit and deposit savings, mirroring the liabilities of households and firms.

    .

    We have arrived at the false “wisdom” that deficits do not matter at the precise historical moment when the sovereign debt of the collapsing American imperium is skyrocketing and burgeoning private debt is suffocating a shrinking middle class throughout the West.
    .

    Even in the best of times, the democratic states were not confidant and visionary enough to steer the economy by Abba Lerner’s lights. At a time when the carrying capacity of the earth has been far exceeded by profligate use of not money but fossil fuel energy, we should be thinking very hard about constraining the use of productive resources, reducing the waste that is poisoning the planet and reducing the hope of prosperity for our posterity.

  4. Mainstream think private investment has to come down when the state increases its investment because they think saving drives investment, right? In their model, isn’t saving needed for investment?

    When, in fact, it’s the other way around. It’s investment that drive saving. “Saving is the accounting record of investment”.

    State investment is by definition non-state saving? No?


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