‘Minibot’ — cosa sono e che rischi comportano

16 Jun, 2019 at 18:44 | Posted in Economics | 4 Comments

Mini-Bot-5euro_webSi torna a parlare di “minibot”. A un anno esatto dalla formazione del Governo, la Camera dei Deputati ha votato all’unanimità una mozione che lo impegna a sbloccare il pagamento degli arretrati dovuti a professionisti e imprese anche ricorrendo a “titoli di Stato di piccolo taglio”, proprio come recitava il “contratto per il governo del cambiamento” siglato dai due partiti di governo. Ma perché mai lo Stato dovrebbe pagare i propri creditori non già con un bonifico ma consegnando dei titoli cartacei, molto simili a banconote, emessi direttamente dal Tesoro?

La formula è criptica al punto che qualche parlamentare ha confessato di aver votato la mozione senza afferrarne il contenuto. Parrebbe, a prima vista, poco rilevante che lo Stato reperisca i fondi per pagare i creditori, oppure consegni direttamente ai creditori dei titoli di nuova emissione. In entrambi i casi, lo Stato paga i creditori indebitandosi. Ma a sentire i promotori (tra cui l’attuale Presidente della Commissione Bilancio della Camera) e a rileggere il passaggio del “contratto” di governo dove si auspicano i minibot “anche valutando nelle sedi opportune la definizione stessa di debito pubblico”, è chiaro a che scopo questa maggioranza potrebbe in futuro ricorrere ai minibot: fare concorrenza alla moneta unica.

Gli ideatori descrivono il minibot come un titolo del Tesoro “sui generis”. Non ha scadenza, quindi non dà diritto a un rimborso in euro all’estinzione, e non paga interessi. A fronte di questo evidente handicap, e a differenza dei comuni titoli pubblici, lo Stato italiano (e solo quello) li accetterebbe in pagamento delle imposte. Nell’auspicio dei promotori, ciò basterebbe per renderli pari all’euro, consentendo al Tesoro di finanziare la spesa con l’emissione diretta di questi “quasi-euro di casa nostra”.

Prima ancora di chiederci se, e a quale valore, queste quasi-banconote sarebbero accettate come mezzi di pagamento, va rilevato che una legge che istituisse una “moneta parallela” non potrebbe essere promulgata dal Capo dello Stato senza averne preventivamente accertato la compatibilità col Trattato sull’Unione Europea. E il progetto evidentemente confligge con l’adesione all’unione monetaria. Tecnicamente, i minibot sono assimilabili alle monete metalliche in euro che teniamo nel borsellino, emesse anch’esse dal Tesoro in quantità autorizzate dalla Banca Centrale Europea, e iscritte a debito dello Stato. Nella migliore delle ipotesi, essi sarebbero considerati nuovo debito. Nella peggiore, sarebbero assimilati alle monete metalliche e anche un solo euro di emissione dovrebbe essere autorizzato dalla Bce.

Se i minibot vi sembrano un tentativo di aggirare le regole sul debito o addirittura una premessa per uscire dall’euro, non vi sbagliate, perché è proprio questa la dichiarata intenzione dei proponenti, i quali si immaginano che in un confronto con la Commissione Europea, la diffusione di queste quasi-banconote consentirebbe di negoziare da una posizione di forza e, se questo non bastasse, offrirebbero una transizione verso la nuova moneta. In realtà, al solo sorgere di uno scontro di tali proporzioni, i prezzi dei veri titoli di Stato (quelli che promettono euro) cadrebbero a picco, causando una vera e propria crisi finanziaria dello Stato e delle banche. E quel giorno il governo si sentirebbe autorizzato a proporre l’Italexit come il male minore.

Amara è l’Europa quando un Paese fondatore contempla vie di uscita, invece di fare proposte credibili per riformare davvero la politica fiscale europea nell’interesse delle generazioni future.

Andrea Terzi

To me, the idea of introducing a ‘parallel currency’ more than anything else shows that the euro crisis is far from over.

The tough austerity measures imposed in the eurozone has made economy after economy contract. And it has not only made things worse in the periphery countries, but also in countries like France and Germany. Alarming facts that should be taken seriously.

Europe may face a future with growing economic disparities where we will have​ to confront increasing hostility between nations and peoples. What we’ve seen lately — especially in France — shows that the protests against technocratic attempts to undermine democracy may go extremely violent.

The problems — created to a large extent by the euro — may not only endanger our economies, but also democracy itself. How much whipping can democracy take? How many more are going to get seriously hurt and ruined before we end this madness and scrap the euro?

4 Comments

  1. ” invece di fare proposte credibili per riformare davvero la politica fiscale europea nell’interesse delle generazioni future.”
    .
    That’s not going to happen is it.

    • Guess you´re right there!

  2. Thank you for this one Lars. Indeed it could not go on like this and all practical solutions to solve this EURO crises is welcome.And yes the EURO system is a failure and indeed it´s real important point made by you that this megalomanic project do not harm only the so called PIIGS countries.It´s not about countries really, the “beggar-thy-neighbour-economics”,has really hurt the german and french workers as well by for example the Hartz I-IV concept.It is a neoclassical-model-builders-project that really should serve as a warning ,that those type of people, living in a fantasy-world, actually could hurt millions of people only by “doin their job” !But as already the Nuremberg trials stated that is no excuse! And the same people that proposed the EURO in our country Sweden, i now hear on almost daily basis appear on radio and TV as “experts” on almost everything,and mostly they try to impose all sorts austerity suggestions in the name of rigour science!
    Here is one proposal:

    “Nine years with euro crisis – time to think anew
    November 20, 2018
    from Trond Andresen, Steve Keen and Marco Cattaneo

    A new means of payment can be part of the solution for the eurozone’s unemployed.

    We have now seen nine years of social crisis and huge unemployment in many euro countries. An entire youth generation has barely experienced anything but being out of work. Still no solution has been found or implemented. The time is overdue to think outside the box.

    We propose a solution that has circulated internationally for several years: some of us have argued for this since 2011.

    Both households and businesses should be provided with an additional national means of payment, “Electronic Parallel Money” (“EPM”).

    Our proposal works like this: EPM transactions take place via mobile phone, PC and card. The transactions are logged on a server in the country’s central bank. There are no EPM coins and notes in circulation. The government (and local authorities) have EPM accounts in the central bank. These are debited when the public pays wages and pensions, or purchases goods and services. All citizens and enterprises also receive a user account there.

    EPM will greatly reduce unemployment and enable people and businesses to exchange goods and services. It will alleviate the social crisis and reduce pessimism in economics and society. Such a solution is now being discussed in Italy, triggered by the acute budgetary conflict with the EU.

    New EPM is created as needed in the central bank. The public sector pays both in EPM and Euro. The ratio can be adjusted based on how the economy develops. Taxes are collected in a corresponding mix of the two currencies. The EPM will have value since it can be used to pay taxes. While government and other public sectors pay expenses and collect taxes in the same and fixed ratios, the euro/EPM mix used in private sector transactions can be freely chosen by the parties involved, and will thus vary.

    We are very aware that an EPM proposal will be met with opposition from the EU’s elites, and many columnists in the financial press. However, the scheme will not be illegal according to EU monetary policy: the EPMs are legally government bonds that are extinguished when holders use them to meet tax claims. In addition, they do not exist physically – there are no EPM banknotes or coins, thus avoiding conflict with the euro’s money monopoly.

    One can expect that the public’s initial confidence in the EPM will be very low, not the least because of widespread skepticism with national authorities who have not managed to counteract the crisis for nine years. For the analysis, it may be useful to define two terms, “trust” and “need”. Although trust is very low from the beginning, the need is very high: one should expect some initial use of the EPM because the options ‘no sale’ or ‘no job’ are worse. Over time, other actors will observe that transactions with the EPM are taking place, which will increase trust – which leads to more acceptance of a certain percentage of EPM in payments.

    Eventually this will also include wages. When firms receive a share of EPMs in payment, they will ask their employees to accept a share of EPMs in wages. And employees will then often have the choice of accepting this or unemployment. This again causes businesses to become more willing to accept EPM in payments. We get a positive spiral.

    After an initial period of political turbulence and low confidence, the EPM will approach a value not so far below the euro, because one EPM counts as one euro in the payment of tax. And as long as the economy is far away from full employment and the business sector has significant spare capacity, the inflationary impact of more money due to the circulation of EPM will be minimal.

    A parallel electronic national currency will – with immediate effects – improve the situation for most residents of euro-crisis countries. It will also give the countries a much stronger position to negotiate euro debt forgiveness or easing the debt service burden.

    Our proposal allows for a gradual and controlled movement towards a national currency, if desired (and yes, we are aware that this will be met with resistance from the EU system). Or for that case, the opposite: to later turn 100 percent back to euro if that option is considered better. It gives the National Assembly in a crisis country time to consider and make decisions in both directions, based on experience with the EPM.

    Sadly, our observation over many years is that it is almost impossible to get public and academic conversation about alternative solutions that can make a big difference. This text is thus an exception. The authors are an engineer and two economists respectively. We wish to emphasize a point (provocative for some colleagues) about the difference between the social sciences’ and engineering culture, and which can explain to some extent why it is so difficult to implement even obvious solutions: social scientists and economists are – in contrast to the engineers – mostly concerned with describing the state of things, not finding solutions. Engineers look for solutions.

    An economist who was very aware of this shortcoming was John Maynard Keynes. He expressed it somewhat sarcastically:

    “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”

    Our EPM proposal ignores “reputation”, and proposes a means to succeed unconventionally when all conventional methods have failed.

    Trond Andresen, associate professor, Department of engineering Cybernetics, NTNU
    Steve Keen, professor of Economics, Kingston University, London
    Marco Cattaneo, founding member “Fiscal Money Group”, chairman CPI Private Equity, Milan”
    https://www.dropbox.com/s/nkv5owz5vew2xbj/eurocrisis-eng.pdf?dl=0&fbclid=IwAR3u3ZlEbuU4v2liWvQUGaajwtQJoUyCLplROpXecPujKNd-WHowWCyngcM

    • To make it clear, to avoid all misunderstandings, i don´t mean that the proposal by Andresen, Keen and Cattaneo in anyway belongs to the proposals in line with the “neoclassical-model-builders-austerity-type-ones”, on the contrary, i find it interesting and there are other ones with great similarities,also well worth lookin at.


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