## Dutch books and money pumps

18 August, 2017 at 17:32 | Posted in Economics | 2 CommentsMainstream neoclassical economics nowadays usually assumes that agents that have to make choices under conditions of uncertainty behave according to Bayesian rules (preferably the ones axiomatized by Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937) or Savage (1954)) – that is, they maximize expected utility with respect to some subjective probability measure that is continually updated according to Bayes theorem. If not, they are supposed to be irrational, and ultimately – via some ‘Dutch book’ or ‘money pump’ argument – susceptible to being ruined by some clever ‘bookie.’

Bayesianism reduces questions of rationality to questions of internal consistency (coherence) of beliefs, but – even granted this questionable reductionism – do rational agents really have to be Bayesian? As I have been arguing elsewhere (e. g. here and here) there is no strong warrant for believing so, but in this post, I want to make a point on the informational requirement that the economic ilk of Bayesianism presupposes.

In many of the situations that are relevant to economics one could argue that there is simply not enough of adequate and relevant information to ground beliefs of a probabilistic kind and that in those situations it is not really possible, in any relevant way, to represent an individual’s beliefs in a single probability measure.

Say you have come to learn (based on own experience and tons of data) that the probability of you becoming unemployed in Sweden is 10%. Having moved to another country (where you have no own experience and no data) you have no information on unemployment and *a fortiori* nothing to help you construct any probability estimate on. A Bayesian would, however, argue that you would have to assign probabilities to the mutually exclusive alternative outcomes and that these have to add up to 1, if you are rational. That is, in this case – and based on symmetry – a rational individual would have to assign probability 10% to becoming unemployed and 90% of becoming employed.

That feels intuitively wrong though, and I guess most people would agree. Bayesianism cannot distinguish between symmetry-based probabilities from information and symmetry-based probabilities from an absence of information. In these kinds of situations, most of us would rather say that it is simply irrational to be a Bayesian and better instead to admit that we ‘simply do not know’ or that we feel ambiguous and undecided. Arbitrary an ungrounded probability claims are more irrational than being undecided in face of genuine uncertainty, so if there is not sufficient information to ground a probability distribution it is better to acknowledge that simpliciter, rather than pretending to possess a certitude that we simply do not possess.

I think this critique of Bayesianism is in accordance with the views of John Maynard Keynes’s *A Treatise on Probability* (1921) and *General Theory* (1936). According to Keynes we live in a world permeated by unmeasurable uncertainty – not quantifiable stochastic risk – which often forces us to make decisions based on anything but rational expectations. Sometimes we ‘simply do not know.’ Keynes would not have accepted the view of Bayesian economists, according to whom expectations “tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction of the theory.” Keynes, rather, thinks that we base our expectations on the confidence or ‘weight’ we put on different events and alternatives. To Keynes, expectations are a question of weighing probabilities by ‘degrees of belief,’ beliefs that have precious little to do with the kind of stochastic probabilistic calculations made by the rational agents modelled by Bayesian economists.

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Thank you, Lars. I, in fact, think Treatise on Probability got even further impact on me than the General Theory, so sharp, distinct and mind clearing! Beste hilsen!

Comment by Anonymous— 18 August, 2017 #

I cannot say I find Keynes’s gambit gesturing at a vague notion of “weight” or confidence either a solution or a satisfying framing of the problem, but I do think his intuition that there is a problem ought to receive more attention.

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Probability occupies some uncomfortable space between the variability of a chaotic universe and our ignorance of an ordered universe, between what we can control and what we do not control, between what we guess we know, what we might be in a position to learn and surprise.

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The Bayesians need a better epistemology. Economics needs control.

Comment by Bruce Wilder— 21 August, 2017 #